The EU’s latest peace gambit for Ukraine’s Donbas could freeze the front line, but it also risks cementing a Russian‑backed status quo. A draft “demilitarised‑zone” (DMZ) – paired with a free‑economic‑zone – resurfaced in December 2025, thrusting Brussels into the centre of a high‑stakes diplomatic tug‑of‑war. If the technical details fall into place, the plan may halt large‑scale combat; if not, it could lock in a frozen conflict that favours Moscow.
What the draft says – both Ukrainian and Russian‑backed forces would pull back from “either side of the current front line”, creating an equidistant strip monitored by an international force that includes the United States, an EU‑led contingent and the OSCE. The zone would be paired with a free‑economic‑zone offering reconstruction funds and commercial privileges, but the exact width of the buffer, the number of troops and the legal status of the economic area remain undisclosed.
Who is shaping it – the proposal is being drafted by the European Commission’s Directorate‑General for Neighbourhood & Enlargement (DG NEAR) under the political guidance of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and the Commissioner for Neighbourhood. The Foreign Affairs Council will adopt the final EU position, while the EU Special Envoy for Ukraine conducts the direct talks with Kyiv, Moscow and the self‑proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk authorities.
On the ground the reactions are contradictory. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced on 11 December 2025 that “Ukraine was ready to accept territorial concessions, including a demilitarised zone in the Donbas”. Yet the Ukrainian presidency swiftly rejected the Le Monde report, with presidential adviser Dmytro Lytvyn insisting no such willingness had been expressed. President Volodymyr Zelensky later warned that any Ukrainian pull‑back must be matched by a Russian retreat and that “security guarantees” are essential to prevent infiltration. From Moscow, Kremlin adviser Yuri Ushakov floated a version in which the Russian National Guard and police would police the zone, effectively placing it under Russian administrative control, while the foreign ministry reiterated a demand that Kyiv cede roughly 30 % of eastern Donetsk.
The diplomatic hurdles are stark. The draft’s vagueness on distance, zone width and verification mechanisms leaves room for each side to interpret the plan to its advantage, fuelling mistrust. Kyiv’s mixed messaging – public statements of openness versus official denials – creates political uncertainty, while Moscow’s insistence on a sizeable territorial concession and a Russian‑policed corridor clashes with the EU’s call for a neutral monitoring force. The legal status of the free‑economic‑zone remains undefined, raising questions about investment security and future governance.
Potential impact – a mutually‑verified withdrawal with robust international monitoring could create a de‑escalation corridor, reduce casualties and open humanitarian routes. Conversely, a Russian‑policed buffer that recognises a 30 % territorial loss for Ukraine would likely solidify a frozen conflict, preserving Moscow’s foothold and limiting Kyiv’s ability to reclaim the occupied lands. The economic component could spur reconstruction, but only if the zone is seen as a neutral development hub rather than a tool for legitimising occupation.
The road ahead – the EU must translate the principle‑based draft into a detail‑rich proposal, specifying exact withdrawal distances, zone dimensions, force composition and the jurisdiction of the economic area. Only a transparent, balanced package can persuade both Kyiv and Moscow to move beyond rhetoric and towards a concrete cease‑fire that might finally bend the war’s trajectory.
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FAQ
Q: What exactly is the EU’s demilitarised‑zone proposal?
A: It calls for a reciprocal pull‑back of Ukrainian and Russian‑backed forces from either side of the current front line, creating a neutral buffer overseen by an international force, and couples this with a free‑economic‑zone offering reconstruction aid and commercial incentives.
Q: Who will police the buffer zone?
A: The draft envisages an EU‑led contingent working with the OSCE and supported by the United States. Russia, however, has suggested that its National Guard and police would handle security, a point that remains contested.
Q: How wide will the buffer be?
A: The exact width has not been disclosed; the draft merely refers to a “strip” whose dimensions are still under negotiation.
Q: What does the free‑economic‑zone entail?
A: It would grant commercial privileges, reconstruction funds and a neutral administration to revive trade and rebuild infrastructure, but its legal status – whether under Ukrainian sovereignty, a special international regime, or de‑facto Russian control – is still undefined.
Q: Why is the proposal controversial for Ukraine?
A: Kyiv insists any pull‑back must be matched by a Russian retreat and demands robust security guarantees to prevent infiltration. The Ukrainian presidency has also denied that it has agreed to any territorial concessions.
Q: What does Russia want in return?
A: Moscow is pressing for a Russian‑policed buffer and has reiterated a demand that Ukraine cede roughly 30 % of the eastern Donetsk region, far beyond the reciprocal withdrawal language the EU promotes.
Image Source: narodnatribuna.info
